Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2003

“Head Start Works Because We Do”: Head Start Programs,
Community Action Agencies, and the Struggle over Unionization
Eloise Pasachoff
Georgetown University Law Center

Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 11-126
Georgetown Business, Economics and Regulatory Law Research Paper No. 11-25

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/692
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1944272

38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 247 (2003)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Society Commons,
and the Social Policy Commons

“Head Start Works Because We Do”:
Head Start Programs, Community Action
Agencies, and the Struggle over Unionization
Eloise Pasachoff∗

Introduction
In the summer of 2002, the city of Boston watched a ªerce battle unfold between low-wage workers who provide child care and the social
service agencies that employ them.1 Boston requires its city contractors
to pay more than twice the federal minimum wage of $5.15 an hour to
their employees, according to the terms of the city’s “living wage” ordinance.2 The social service agencies, which receive government subsidies
to run their child care programs, claimed that they could not afford to pay
this rate. These agencies mounted an intense legal and political campaign, arguing that they would be forced to lay off workers if the city did
not exempt them from the living wage requirement, and that they would
be compelled to cut off affordable child care for low-income working
parents as a consequence.3 Child care workers, through advocacy groups,
responded vigorously that the workers were no less in need of economic
support than these low-income working parents, arguing that these are
the very types of workers the law was intended to protect.4
∗ A.B., Harvard College, 1995; M.A., Yale University, 1998; J.D.-M.P.A. candidate,
Harvard Law School-Kennedy School of Government, 2004. Summer internships at the
Administration for Children and Families (2001) and at Community Action Program Legal
Services (2002) sparked my interest in this topic. Thanks are due to my supervisors and
colleagues there, as well as to the Imagitas Fellowship and Rappaport Fellowship that
supported those internships. Tom Glaisyer and David Yamada gave helpful comments on
early drafts of this Note. Donna Hogle offered insight from the ªeld. The editing team at
the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review pushed me to clarify my ideas and
writing. My family continues to provide the model for scholarship and writing to which I
aspire. Any errors in substance or style are mine alone. Please address comments to
eloise.pasachoff@post.harvard.edu.
1 See generally Sarah Schweitzer, “Living Wage” Threatens Child Care, Boston
Globe, July 22, 2002, at A1.
2 Id. (noting that the living wage, as of July 2002, was $10.54 per hour); see also Boston, Mass., Municipal Code § 24-6.2 (2002), Am. Legal Publ’g Corp., available at
http://www.amlegal.com/boston_ma (as of Nov. 29, 2002) (establishing a minimum living
wage of $10.25 per hour and providing a formula for annual adjustments).
3 See Schweitzer, supra note 1.
4 Id. In November 2002, the city of Boston decided to grant one-year waivers to four
social service agencies that provide child-care services and that had demonstrated hardship
in paying the living wage. See Sarah Schweitzer, City Gives First-Ever Wage Law Waivers,
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Although this particular battle was new, the principles behind it were
not. The conºict over the living wage waiver is reminiscent of another
struggle that has been taking place around the country for more than a
decade as teachers and other employees of Head Start programs initiate
union drives and their nonproªt Community Action Agency employers
attempt to thwart these efforts. Over the past ªfteen years, the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU),5 the United Auto Workers (UAW),6
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME),7 the American Federation of Teachers (AFT),8 and other labor unions9 have embarked on union organizing campaigns at Head Start
programs in Community Action Agencies (CAAs) across the country,
from Boston to Houston,10 Hartford to Los Angeles,11 New York City to
Cleveland,12 Minneapolis to Michigan.13 “Head Start works because we
do,” one union’s slogan proclaims.14 Although some CAA employers
have accepted the union drives without much rancor, labor strife between
Head Start teachers and their employers has been a common story.
Both the living wage struggle and the unionization conºicts manifest
a strange tension. The avowed mission of many social service agencies,
including the CAAs that operate Head Start programs, is to empower individuals, families, and communities in poverty and to assist them along
the path to economic self-sufªciency.15 The labor movement and worker

Boston Globe, Nov. 18, 2002, at B1 [hereinafter Schweitzer, First-Ever Waivers]. The
agencies had requested three-year waivers. Id. Twelve other agencies that had similarly
requested three-year waivers were not exempted from the Living Wage Ordinance at all. Id.
5 See, e.g., Jon Tevlin, Kinder, Gentler Union Busting: Companies Finding New Ways
to Thwart Organizing Efforts, Star Trib. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Nov. 3, 1997, at D1.
6 See, e.g., Tom Condon, Union Drive Shows Need to Shrink an Empire, Hartford
Courant, Apr. 15, 1999, at A3, 1999 WL 6359773.
7 See, e.g., Kathleen Kerr, Head Start Workers Calling for Investigation of Funds,
Newsday (N.Y., Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Aug. 24, 1990, at 22, 1990 WL 3353482.
8 See, e.g., Mary Anne Perez, Azteca Director Has Her Backers, L.A. Times, Oct. 11,
1992, City Times, at 10.
9 See, e.g., Julio Moran, Deep Stafªng Cuts Proposed to Save Head Start Program,
L.A. Times (Valley ed.), Apr. 3, 1993, at B3, 1993 WL 2332076.
10 See, e.g., Diane E. Lewis, Antipoverty Agency ABCD Votes Against Union, Boston
Globe, Dec. 9, 1997, at C18; Claudia Kolker, Social-Service Group Elects to Join a Union: Workers Complain of Bad Job Policies, Houston Chron., Jan. 22, 1997, at A22, 1999
WL 6536249.
11 See, e.g., Condon, supra note 6; Perez, supra note 8.
12 See, e.g., Alexis Jetter, Head Start Staff Plans Walkout Over Pensions, Newsday
(N.Y., City ed.), Mar. 26, 1989, at 8, 1989 WL 3367814; Sandra Livingston, A Lesson in
Value: Head Start Teachers, Aides Seek Respect, Union Assistance, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), May 30, 1999, at 1E, 1999 WL 2365621.
13 See, e.g., Tevlin, supra note 5; FiveCAP, Inc., No. GR-7-CA-43295, 2001 NLRB
LEXIS 903 (NLRB A.L.J. Nov. 2, 2001).
14 Am. Fed’n of State, County and Mun. Employees (AFSCME), Head Start Poster,
available at http://www.afscme.org/publications/hsv/hsv00204.htm (last visited Nov. 29,
2002) [hereinafter Head Start Poster].
15 See Community Services Block Grant Act § 672, 42 U.S.C. § 9901 (2000). The purpose of the Act is
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advocates claim similar goals.16 What, then, lies behind this clash, and
what dynamics does the conºict create? More importantly, how can the
parties move beyond this conºict and mutually support their common
missions?
Answering these questions is crucial, for the issues at the heart of
this struggle are hardly going away. As living wage movements gain
momentum around the country,17 as social service labor unions gain
inºuence in the labor movement,18 as the nonproªt sector increases in
prominence,19 and as the country turns its attention to early childhood
education and to the low-wage labor market in the wake of welfare reform,20 the workforce that is the subject of the Head Start unionization
battle stands at the center of important national concerns.

to provide assistance to States and local communities, working through a network
of community action agencies and other neighborhood-based organizations, for
the reduction of poverty, the revitalization of low-income communities, and the
empowerment of low-income families and individuals in rural and urban areas to
become fully self-sufªcient . . . [to obtain] the maximum participation of residents of the low-income communities and members of the groups served by programs assisted through the block grants made under this chapter to empower such
residents and members to respond to the unique problems and needs within their
communities . . . [including a variety of groups such as] individual citizens, and
business, labor, and professional groups, who are able to inºuence the quantity
and quality of opportunities and services for the poor.
Id.; see also Head Start Act § 636, 42 U.S.C. § 9831 (2000) (stating that the objective of
the Act is “to promote school readiness by enhancing the social and cognitive development
of low-income children through the provision, to low-income children and their families,
of health, educational, nutritional, social, and other services that are determined, based on
family needs assessments, to be necessary”).
16 See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Labor-Cong. of Indus. Orgs. (AFL-CIO), What We Stand
For: Mission and Goals of the AFL-CIO, available at http://www.aº-cio.org (last visited
Nov. 29, 2002). The AFL-CIO states that its mission is
to improve the lives of working families . . . . We will make the voices of working
families heard across our nation and in our neighborhoods. We will create vibrant
community labor councils that reach out to workers at the local level. We will
strengthen the ties of labor to our allies. We will speak out in effective and creative ways on behalf of all working Americans.
Id.
17 See, e.g., Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now (ACORN), Living Wage Resource
Center, available at http://www.livingwagecampaign.org (last visited Nov. 29, 2002) (describing ªfteen living wage campaigns spearheaded by ACORN over the last six years).
18 The increased prominence of social service unions is due at least in part to the decline of domestic manufacturing. See, e.g., Katherine S. Newman, No Shame in My
Game: The Working Poor in the Inner City 44, 153–54, 274–75 (1999); Rebecca M.
Blank, It Takes a Nation: A New Agenda for Fighting Poverty 67 (1997); William
Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor 28–31
(1996).
19 See generally Peter Dobkin Hall, Inventing the Nonproªt Sector and
Other Essays on Philanthropy, Volunteerism, and Nonproªt Organizations (1992).
20 See, e.g., Work and Family Act of 2002, S. 2524, 107th Cong. (2002); SelfSufªciency Act, H.R. 3667, 107th Cong. (2002); A Living Wage, Jobs for All Act, H.R.
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This Note outlines initial answers to the questions above. After
brieºy describing the history and mission of CAAs and the Head Start
program, and their intersection with the labor movement, Part I analyzes
the practical, rhetorical, and legal arenas in which the battle over Head
Start unionization is waged. Part II proposes strategies for change, offering legislative solutions, regulatory proposals, and preemptive problemsolving and dispute resolution possibilities. My central thesis is that the
labor movement and the CAAs that operate Head Start programs have
many common interests and overlapping missions, and that the two sides
in this conºict can and should move beyond competition to cooperation.
The struggle over unionization is not simply about the distribution of an
inadequate pot of money, so it is not a zero-sum game; beneath the
speciªc points of contention lie opportunities for the parties to work together amicably to achieve better results. I focus on unions in Head Start
programs, rather than on the living wage, because the union struggle has
a much longer history, but I hope that lessons from the union struggle
will inform the emerging living wage debate. In fact, the battle over the
living wage may actually comprise the latest stage in the Head Start unionization conºict, since unions themselves have organized and supported several living wage campaigns in recent years.21 Understanding
the history of this conºict is essential to changing its future.
I. The Contours of the Conºict
Community Action Agencies and Head Start both came into existence as part of President Johnson’s War on Poverty.22 In 1964, the Economic Opportunity Act23 created a national network of local community
agencies (CAAs) designed to combat poverty by organizing and employing low-income adults. Today, more than 1100 CAAs serve more than ten
3682, 107th Cong. (2002).
21 See, e.g., Janice Fine, Moving Innovation from the Margins to the Center, in A New
Labor Movement for the New Century 119, 129–33 (Gregory Mantsios ed., 1998)
[collection hereinafter New Labor Movement] (framing the Baltimore living wage campaign as “a key component of community unionism”); Steven Lerner, Taking the Offensive,
Turning the Tide, in New Labor Movement, supra, at 69, 80 (noting the importance of
living wage campaigns in union strategies); John J. Sweeney, America Needs a Raise:
Fighting for Economic Security and Social Justice 118 (1996) (describing nationwide living wage campaigns organized by “labor unions and their allies” in localities including Baltimore, Milwaukee, Santa Clara County, Denver, New York City, New Orleans,
Chicago, and Los Angeles).
22 See generally Nat’l Ass’n for State Cmty. Servs. Programs (NASCSP), Community Services Network: The Community Services Block Grant in Action, Fiscal Year 2000 (2001), available at http://www.ezlistings.com/MemberFiles/L2084/Text4.
pdf [hereinafter NASCSP]; Edward Zigler & Susan Muenchow, Head Start: The
Inside Story of America’s Most Successful Educational Experiment (1992).
23 See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 202, 78 Stat. 508,
516; NASCSP, supra note 22, at 8.
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million low-income people across the nation, in urban as well as rural
areas, through a variety of anti-poverty programs.24 In 1965, the ªrst
Head Start programs opened their doors around the country to provide
comprehensive services—including health care, social services, and early
education—to poor children of preschool age. Head Start programs themselves reached almost one million children through approximately 1500
grantees in the past ªscal year.25 Although many Head Start programs are
operated by service providers other than CAAs, the national Community
Action network is the biggest single provider of Head Start, and Head
Start is among the largest programs that CAAs run.26
At the federal level, control of and support for CAAs comes from
the Ofªce of Community Services, which is housed within the Department of Health and Human Services’ Administration for Children and
Families (ACF).27 ACF also contains the federal agency for Head Start
programs, the Head Start Bureau.28 Federal funds for CAAs are provided
in block grants to the states, which then allocate the money to local
CAAs.29 In 2000, each dollar of federal money administered to CAAs
leveraged an additional ªve dollars from state, local, and private funds.30
In contrast, Head Start funds pass directly from ACF to the local grantees,31 which must contribute twenty percent of their total Head Start
budget; federal funds make up the other eighty percent.32
Head Start has never limited its scope exclusively to meeting the
needs of children. Rather, since its inception, Head Start has provided
unemployed parents with training and job opportunities, often as Head

24 See NASCSP, supra note 22, at 6. CAAs not only run Head Start programs, but also
provide job training, educate individuals on income management, help make houses and
apartments more energy efªcient, partner with health clinics, and identify and create solutions for speciªc community problems where no clear program already exists. See id. at
17–19.
25 Head Start Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2002 Head Start
Fact Sheet, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/hsb/research/factsheets.htm
(last modiªed Oct. 2, 2002).
26 See NASCSP, supra note 22, at 9.
27 See generally Admin. for Children & Families, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., ACF Home Page, at http://www.acf.hhs.gov (last modiªed Nov. 26, 2002).
28 See generally Head Start Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HSB Home
Page, at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/hsb (last visited Nov. 29, 2002).
29 See NASCSP, supra note 22, at 10.
30 Id. at 11.
31 For controversies surrounding attempts in 1974 and 1981 to make Head Start a block
grant, see Zigler & Muenchow, supra note 22, at 176–77, 194–98.
32 See Valora Washington & Ura Jean Oyemade Bailey, Project Head Start:
Models and Strategies for the Twenty-First Century 30–31 (1994).
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Start employees.33 CAAs also have been actively involved in moving individuals and families off public assistance and into well-paying jobs.34
At a fundamental level, then, CAAs that administer Head Start programs appear to be natural allies of the labor movement, which has
claimed the mantle of ªghting for American workers for more than a century. One scholar articulates the mission of the labor movement from
1955 to 1995—the same period that witnessed the rise of CAAs and
Head Start programs—as “insur[ing] fair wages, increas[ing] job security, protect[ing] against victimization, improv[ing] the conditions of
work, and provid[ing] additional beneªts.”35 It is difªcult to believe that
managers of CAAs and Head Start programs would not embrace this
mission for their clients, many of whom are low-wage workers. Indeed,
the labor movement’s current mission ªts even more clearly into the
grassroots, community-empowering goals of CAAs and Head Start. The
new unionism “encourages a shift away from the narrow institutional
interests of unions and toward a focus on building coalitions and a broad
social movement,” supports not only current union members but also
low-income workers in every sector, pays more attention to women and
minorities than ever before, and places greater emphasis on “grassroots
efforts and direct action.”36
Despite similarities in the goals of labor organizers and CAAoperated Head Start programs, the two movements remained largely unconnected for several decades; not until the mid-1980s did their interactions make national news. Sadly, it was labor strife, not a new collaborative effort, that drew them together. Teachers at a Head Start program on
Long Island, New York, unionized in 1987 and ultimately went on strike
after months of unsuccessful contract negotiations, thereby shutting
down the program temporarily.37 The issues that emerged in this
conºict—the disputes over wages, the war of words, and the legal maneuvering—have resurfaced around the country time and again over the
past ªfteen years, with little variation.38

33 See, e.g., Zigler & Muenchow, supra note 22, at 227 (“Head Start from its outset
was designed as a two-generational program, promoting social competence for children
and economic self-sufªciency for parents. At its best, Head Start has incorporated both a
jobs and a services strategy in attacking poverty.”).
34 See NASCSP, supra note 22, at 18.
35 Gregory Mantsios, What Does Labor Stand For?, in New Labor Movement, supra
note 21, at 44, 46.
36 Id. at 50–51.
37 See, e.g., Adam Z. Horvath, Head-Start Strike: 200 in Suffolk to Picket; Centers Vow
to Open, Newsday (N.Y., Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Apr. 11, 1988, at 2, 1988 WL 2944996.
There were earlier attempts to unionize Head Start programs elsewhere, but none received
as much press coverage as this story. See, e.g., Econ. Opportunity Planning Ass’n of
Greater Toledo, Inc., No. 83-127, DAB No. 591 (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Appeals
Bd. Nov. 6, 1984), 1984 WL 250057 (citing a claim that the Head Start director’s alleged
“inept leadership” led to employees’ attempt to unionize in 1980).
38 See, e.g., supra notes 5–12 and discussion infra Part I.A–C.
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These battles over unionization in CAA-operated Head Start programs take place on three levels. In the practical arena, the CAA directors and Head Start employees argue over speciªc bread-and-butter issues. In the rhetorical arena, both sides wage heated media campaigns in
an attempt to gather public support. Finally, in the legal arena, each side
argues its case to a court or to the National Labor Relations Board. It is
important to understand these arenas of dispute, not because the issues
are new—the arguments and strategies resonate with labor struggles in
other sectors—but rather because the familiar issues take on new meanings in this context of anti-poverty social service agencies. Labor
conºicts in CAAs and Head Start programs arose quickly and spread rapidly, and there has been little systematic effort to understand the central
issues driving the sides apart. It is necessary to understand the dynamics
of this conºict in order to ªnd national solutions for what has turned out
to be a national problem.
A. Practical Issues
One central issue in many Head Start union campaigns is the level of
compensation in salary and beneªts earned by Head Start workers. In
most union drives there has been no city-wide living wage ordinance to
contend with, so union organizers have pointed to another external index
of fairness: the salaries paid to preschool and kindergarten teachers in the
public school system. In a 1999 union drive in Cleveland, organizers contrasted a Head Start teacher who made less than $21,000 teaching preschoolers with a kindergarten teacher who could make $35,000.39 Union
drives and contract battles have also focused on pensions, a beneªt generally received by public school teachers but rarely obtained by Head
Start employees. In 1989, for example, 1500 Head Start employees serving 11,000 children in New York City threatened to walk out over the
issue of pensions, which no Head Start employee in the city had at that
time.40 The threat alone was successful, and employees won retroactive
pensions commensurate with their years of service to the program without actually striking.41
The issue of disparate compensation between Head Start instructors
and teachers in the public school system has also been widely discussed
outside the union context. In 1990, the National Head Start Association
released a report ªnding that almost half of all Head Start teachers
earned less than $10,000 a year.42 Even a Head Start teacher with a college degree would start at just under $12,000—thirty-seven percent less
39

Livingston, supra note 12.
See Jetter, supra note 12.
41 See Kevin Flynn, City Settles with Head Start, Newsday (N.Y., City Ed.), Mar. 31,
1989, at 30, 1989 WL 3348971.
42 See Washington & Bailey, supra note 32, at 120–21.
40
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than a public school teacher in a comparable position would make.43 In a
recent decision in the decades-long Abbott v. Burke litigation over facilities funding in New Jersey public schools, the court expressed concern
that Head Start was facing a “brain drain” as qualiªed teachers left for
the public school system, and emphasized that “[d]istricts must address
salary parity.”44 Directors of Head Start programs—“management” in the
Head Start union wars—also publicly acknowledge the difªculties they
face in attracting and retaining qualiªed staff, given better salaries and
beneªts in the public schools.45
When faced with union demands for better salaries and beneªts,
however, some directors of Head Start programs have refused to negotiate, explaining that their hands are ªnancially tied.46 They note that
CAAs have a limited amount of money to spend.47 As one CAA director
said to the Boston Globe last summer regarding the living wage, “We
would be happy to pay it if someone would give us the money.”48 Alternatively, CAA directors may pit Head Start teachers against other worthy
recipients of public funds. For instance, the City of New York eventually
did offer pensions to its Head Start employees, but it said it would have
to cut other programs in order to do so.49
Yet solutions to these disputes over disparate compensation do exist.
Some Head Start directors have found creative ways to provide increased
compensation for their teachers. In the mid-1980s, a Head Start program
director in Cambridge, Massachusetts, designed a retirement plan for her
staff members with a three percent contribution by Head Start, ªnding it
unacceptable that the Head Start instructors would otherwise be without
retirement beneªts even after spending decades with the program.50 In
1986, Head Start teachers in Broward County, Florida, shifted to the
same compensation scale used in the local public schools.51 Thus, at least
in some circumstances, it is possible to expand the size of the pie and
provide compensation levels that beneªt both instructors and Head Start
programs. Why, then, do negotiations over compensation so frequently

43

Id.
Abbott v. Burke, 790 A.2d 842, 853 (N.J. 2002).
45 See, e.g., Head Start Reauthorization: Hearing on H.R. 4151 Before the Subcomm.
on Children, Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Res., 101st Cong. 39–41 (1990) (statement of Sister Barbara McMichael, Director, Providence Head Start, Providence, R.I.); The Future of Head Start: Hearing on H.R. 4151 Before the Subcomm. on Educ. and Health of the Joint Econ. Comm., 101st Cong. 63–64
(1990) (statement of Sandra Waddell, Director, North Shore Community Action Programs,
Inc., Beverly, Mass.).
46 See Condon, supra note 6.
47 See id.
48 Schweitzer, supra note 1.
49 See George James, Preschool Staff Demand Pensions: Head Start Workers, Saying
Negotiations are Stymied, Take to the Picket Lines, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1988, § 1, at 65.
50 See Zigler & Muenchow, supra note 22, at 214.
51 See id. at 216.
44
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descend into either/or ªghts between these teachers (through their unions) and the directors?
One way to explain this phenomenon is that union drives usually occur after trust and respect between labor and management have dissipated. In such a hostile environment, collaboration to solve problems is
more difªcult to achieve.52 A common refrain in union drives in all economic sectors is that management does not respect employees.53 This
complaint is particularly jarring in anti-poverty agencies, many of whose
employees are former clients. Still, the complaints come. When management refuses to meet with employee negotiating teams,54 or when Head
Start instructors are asked to perform menial tasks that make them feel
like babysitters rather than professionals,55 employees argue that they are
not being valued or appreciated.
On the other side, CAA directors who otherwise might sympathize
with the labor movement may feel attacked and misunderstood, and consequently may refuse to negotiate or collaborate, when union leaders
(particularly those from outside the social service sector and the educational community) waltz into their agency ofªces and demand to meet
with them,56 or, alternatively, seemingly engage in delaying tactics in negotiations.57 CAA directors can become especially frustrated by, and
dismissive of, outside union organizers who fail to acknowledge the constraints imposed on Head Start programs by federal regulations.58
Lawyers for CAAs and Head Start programs emphasize the importance of mutual trust and respect in creating workplace environments
where employees will not want to unionize. One lawyer in Minneapolis
attempts to convey this fundamental point in his “union avoidance”
workshops: “[C]ompanies have unions because they deserve them.”59 He

52 See William N. Cooke, Labor-Management Cooperation: New Partnerships
or Ongoing Circles? 121–25 (1990) (analyzing the role of distrust in inhibiting labormanagement cooperation). But see Charles T. Kerchner & Julia E. Koppich, Rethinking
Labor-Management Relations; It’s a Matter of Trust, Or Is It?, at http://63.197.216.234/
crcl/mindworkers/udpages/rethinking.htm (2000) (describing innovation and creativity in
teacher-school district negotiations as more important for achieving educational results
than developing trust for trust’s sake).
53 See, e.g., Toni Gilpin et al., On Strike for Respect: The Clerical and Technical Workers’ Strike at Yale University, 1984–85, at 9 (1995); see also Sweeney,
supra note 21, at 124 (“The most important thing we can do is to assist working men and
women who are organizing for raises, rights, and respect.”).
54 See Molly Kavanaugh, New Head of Agency Cancels Talks with Union, Plain
Dealer (Cleveland), Oct. 13, 1999, at 1B, 1999 WL 2386876.
55 See Livingston, supra note 12.
56 See Telephone Interview with Donna M. Hogle, Coordinator, Indiana Head StartState Collaboration Ofªce (Oct. 17, 2002).
57 See Kavanaugh, supra note 54 (reporting a CAA director’s interpretation of the union representatives’ delay in meeting at a scheduled time as “a sign of disrespect”).
58 See Telephone Interview with Donna M. Hogle, supra note 56.
59 Tevlin, supra note 5.
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explains that “proper human relations” are one way to avoid a union
drive, and that the “best way to keep a union out is by creating trust.”60
Employees and directors of Head Start programs would seem to
agree that trust and respect are critical factors in the manager-employee
relationship. The question is how to ensure that this point of agreement
actually gets implemented in a meaningful way, rather than as deceptive
language masking either an illegal anti-union campaign or a union drive
focused on unionization at any cost and above all else.
B. Rhetorical Arguments
As the preceding discussion suggests, important substantive issues
underlie union-management conºicts in Head Start programs. How
should the salary and beneªt scales be set? How can structures for improved employee-management communication be designed? Yet these
arguments over practical issues often slip into rhetorical battles where
each side insists that its own demands are indispensable and engages in
accusatory fault-ªnding and self-absolution.
The ªrst set of rhetorical arguments commonly used in Head Start
union debates involves competing visions of race and gender. From the
unions’ perspective, CAAs are trampling on the rights of the poor, minority women who work there. Article after article about the Head Start union movement repeats this demographic theme, emphasizing that some
Head Start employees earn so little that they meet the income qualiªcations to obtain food stamps and to enroll their own children in Head Start
programs.61 These employees deserve better, say the unions, but CAAs
are taking advantage of them.62
From the perspective of some CAAs, however, unions are dominated
by white outsiders who want to exert control over social service agencies
with large minority constituencies and leadership. Robert M. Coard,
president and chief executive of Action for Boston Community Development (ABCD), voiced this perspective after ABCD employees voted
against union representation by the SEIU: “There were . . . no minorities
in the delegation of organizers. I think people looked at that and said,
‘Who are they representing?’”63 Alyce Dillon, executive director of the
60

See id.
See, e.g., Tim Bryant, Union Supporters Picket YWCA Headquarters, St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Feb. 18, 1997, at 2B; Livingston, supra note 12; Editorial, Suffolk Must
Save Stalled Head Start Program, Newsday (N.Y., Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Aug. 15, 1988,
at 54, 1999 WL 2970881; see also Lucie White, On the Guarding of Borders, 33 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 183, 188–89, 194 (1998) (stating that Head Start prioritizes hiring parents of its students as its staff and suggesting that many parents who participate in the
program are low-income, minority women).
62 See Bryant, supra note 61; Kolker, supra note 10; Livingston, supra note 12; Editorial, supra note 61.
63 Lewis, supra note 10. ABCD was one of the agencies that requested, but did not re61
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Minneapolis-based Parents In Community Action (PICA), was more direct in her criticism: “White folks in charge, that’s what [the union leaders’] agenda is . . . White folks in charge, second-class treatment for everyone else.”64 Dillon went on to accuse the National Labor Relations
Board, unions, and the national educational establishment of conspiring
with each other: “This is about trying to teach poor and minority people a
lesson. If you’re not under control, we’ll get you. That’s what this is
about.”65
The unions and the CAAs thus make exactly the same argument
about the exploitation of women and minorities, simply trading accusations of wrongdoing. But the arguments on each side lack nuance. It is
easy to note in an aside, as did the article that reported Alyce Dillon’s
anti-union tirade, that Dillon is white and makes $85,000 a year, while
most Head Start employees make less than $20,000; the article implicitly
suggested that Dillon herself is ignorant of the ªnancial difªculties that
her low-income employees face.66 Yet this image of the Head Start director is incomplete, for Dillon once was a single mother on welfare, living
in public housing, separated from a drug-addicted husband, with two
children in Head Start.67 Likewise, although even a cursory review of the
labor movement’s history will reveal numerous instances where women
and minorities were excluded from union representation and leadership,
suggestions that unions cannot fully involve women and minorities ignore serious efforts and successes in doing so.68 In fact, the arguments of
both sides are complementary, not competing—CAAs can be helping
poor individuals and taking advantage of a low-wage labor market at the
same time. This rhetorical debate about race and gender does little to advance solutions.
A second rhetorical argument focuses on the welfare of children in
Head Start programs. Each side portrays itself as the champion of this
vulnerable population, and either explicitly or implicitly accuses the
ceive, a waiver from Boston’s Living Wage Ordinance in the summer of 2002. See
Schweitzer, supra note 1; Schweitzer, First-Ever Waivers, supra note 4.
64 Doug Grow, Head Start Gets Black Eye in Fight: Firing Union Organizer Hurts Image of Popular Program, Star Trib. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Aug. 31, 1997, at B2.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See Hearing on the Reauthorization of the Head Start Act: Hearing on H.R. 4151
Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st
Cong. 188, 192 (1990) (testimony and written statement of Alyce Dillon, Director, Parents
in Community Action, Inc., Minneapolis, Minn.).
68 See, e.g., Larry Adams, Transforming Unions and Building a Movement, in New
Labor Movement, supra note 21, at 202; May Chen & Kent Wong, The Challenge of
Diversity and Inclusion in the AFL-CIO, in New Labor Movement, supra note 21, at
185; José La Luz & Paula Finn, Getting Serious About Inclusion: A Comprehensive Approach, in New Labor Movement, supra note 21, at 171; Ruth Needleman, Women Workers: Strategies for Inclusion and Rebuilding Unionism, in New
Labor Movement, supra note 21, at 151; see also Norma M. Riccucci, Women,
Minorities, and Unions in the Public Sector (1990).
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other side of selªshly prioritizing its own needs. For instance, CAAs may
suggest that teachers who are truly committed to the well-being of children do not need much in the way of ªnancial remuneration. Thus Irene
Tovar, executive director of the Latin American Civic Association in the
Los Angeles area, praised her agency’s reorganization strategy, which
included union-opposed layoffs.69 She explained how much the CAA
cared for children: “We wanted to show that we had the kids’ interest at
heart, ªrst and foremost. The agency has been able to show that once we
took out all the hurt feelings and misunderstandings, that our real commitment has been to the kids.”70
On the ºip side, a union ofªcial in New York City made a similar
point with regard to employees of city-run day care and Head Start programs whose pay had been delayed for six weeks. Raglan George explained that the employees had “worked without pay because of concern
for the children,” and critiqued then-mayor Rudolph Giuliani for “crippling the children.”71 As one editorial wryly observed: “Dedicated teachers, so the stereotype goes, ªnd a satisfaction in working with children
that compensates for their low wages. But dedication alone does not put
groceries on the table or pay the rent. Dedication does not make up for a
lack of health coverage and retirement beneªts.”72
This rhetorical battle is difªcult to win. Both sides undoubtedly are
concerned that speciªc proposals might help or harm the children whom
it is their common mission to serve, but their competing claims ultimately do the children little good. A newspaper article written at the
early stages of the Head Start union movement framed the problem of
these competing perspectives bluntly: “Both sides said they had the interests of the program’s children at heart. But some parents found it difªcult
to trust either [side].”73 By engaging in verbal warfare rather than addressing the concrete problems that actually affect the lives of lowincome children, Head Start teachers and CAA directors alike can alienate parents and damage relationships with children and families.
In a third rhetorical argument, unions and Community Action Agencies battle over the “true nature” of the CAA. On the one hand, unions
portray CAAs as having abandoned their grass-roots origins to become
big business, multi-million-dollar agencies that squeeze everything they
can out of their employees. One article describing a union drive in Hartford’s largest CAA, the Community Renewal Team (CRT), reºects this
perspective:
69 See Julio Moran, Head Start Program Can Reapply for Funds, L.A. Times (Valley
ed.), May 5, 1993, at B6, 1993 WL 2320039.
70 Id.
71 Curtis J. Kheel, Checks Not in the Mail: Unpaid Day-Care Workers Protest Delay in
Pay, Newsday (N.Y., Queens ed.), Nov. 5, 1996, at A27, 1996 WL 2543320.
72 Editorial, Vital Jobs, Meager Pay, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 5, 1990, at 20.
73 Horvath, supra note 37.
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CRT was incorporated 35 years ago as an anti-poverty agency.
Its founders hoped it would do its job and be out of business by
1970. It didn’t go out of business, it is business. CRT now has
600 employees, 450 of whom are full time, and an annual
budget last year of about $48 million. The executive director,
Paul C. Puzzo, makes almost $140,000 a year . . . . CRT is now
what used to be called “the establishment.74
On the other hand, CAAs assert that they are local organizations run by
local folks, and that the millions of dollars they manage are federal funds
that go directly to empower the local poor.75
Outside the context of a unionization battle, in a less heated moment, one former Head Start director offers a perspective that combines
both views. The world of Head Start is changing, says Donna Hogle, the
former director of a Head Start program and the current Head Start Collaboration Project Coordinator for the state of Indiana.76 Given the size of
the programs’ budgets—which often run into the millions77—and the
need to partner and negotiate with so many different groups, the successful operation of Head Start programs now requires greater business skills
than were needed twenty years ago.78 Although she describes the CAAs
that operate Head Start programs as big business, she recognizes their
community roots and the number of parent-employees in Head Start programs, and she suggests that both sides must work together more amicably to direct the limited federal dollars to their intended community recipients.79 As with the rhetorical arguments over race and gender and over
the best interests of children, then, arguments over the “true nature” of
Community Action Agencies have truth on both sides.
Since each side usually offers the mirror image of the other’s assertions, it is difªcult to make an independent assessment of the rhetorical
arguments employed in the Head Start union struggle. Empirical data
could help resolve some of these arguments. For example, since each side
claims to be the true champion of the least powerful, a statistical comparison of the racial and gender demographics of union leaders and CAA
directors might prove useful. However, empirical evidence can be manipulated easily to continue the war of words.80 In the end, the rhetorical
battles needlessly simplify and obscure the complex reality to which both
sides must pay attention in order to achieve their common goals.
74

Condon, supra note 6.
See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 12.
76 Telephone Interview with Donna M. Hogle, supra note 56.
77 See, e.g., Diane E. Lewis, Union Looks to Organize ABCD Staff: Move is Part of Effort by Labor in US to Expand into Nonproªt Groups, Boston Globe, June 20, 1997, at
E1.
78 See Telephone Interview with Donna M. Hogle, supra note 56.
79 Id.
80 See generally Darrell Huff, How to Lie with Statistics (1954).
75
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C. Legal Challenges
Head Start workers and their Community Action Agency employers
wage two primary legal battles in the war over unionization. The ªrst
battle is over whether federal or state labor law will govern the dispute.
The second battle emerges as each side trades accusations of unfair labor
practices.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is the federal law that
governs labor relations in the private sector.81 It guarantees workers the
right to bargain collectively with their employers over the terms of their
employment82 and protects them against employer reprisals for engaging
in union activity.83 It imposes obligations on both employers and unions
to bargain in good faith without engaging in unfair labor practices, which
it extensively deªnes.84 The NLRA established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enforce the NLRA.85 The NLRB includes the ªvemember Board that issues ªnal administrative decisions, a general counsel that supervises regional and ªeld ofªces, and those regional and ªeld
ofªces.86 At the request of either the union or the employer, regional
ofªces administer union elections and determine whether unions or employers have engaged in an unfair labor practice.87 Regional administrative law judges hold initial hearings and issue initial decisions, which
may be appealed up to the ªve-member Board in Washington, D.C.88 Final decisions issued by the Board may be appealed directly to a U.S.
Court of Appeals.89
The NLRA exempts government employers and any “political subdivision” from its coverage,90 leaving such employers to be governed by
state labor laws.91 The ªrst legal question in the Head Start unionization
context is whether the Community Action Agency employer falls within
this exemption. Put another way, the argument centers around whether
the NLRB has jurisdiction over the employer. In general, CAAs have argued that they are exempt “political subdivisions,” while employees of
81

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2000).
See id. § 157.
83 See id. § 158(a).
84 See id. § 158(a)–(b), (d).
85 See id. § 153.
86 See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., A Guide to Basic Law and Procedure Under
the National Labor Relations Act 52 (rev. ed. 1997), available at http://www.nlrb.
gov/publications/basicguide.pdf.
87 See id.
88 See id. at 58.
89 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2000).
90 Id. § 152(2) (“The term ‘employer’ . . . shall not include the United States or any
wholly owned Government corporation . . . or any State or political subdivision thereof
. . . .”).
91 See Peter L. Ebb, Uniformity Replaces Chaos, Sort of: CAA Coverage Under the National Labor Relations Act, CAPLAW Legal Update (Cmty. Action Prog. Legal Servs.,
Inc.), Apr. 2000, at 5.
82
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Head Start programs and CAAs have argued that the NLRA applies.92
Employees have tended to seek redress under the NLRB for its perceived
greater protection for employees than state labor laws, while employers
have generally opposed NLRB jurisdiction for the same reason.93 Employees have recently begun to win this dispute over jurisdiction. Two
separate strands of NLRB decisions over the last decade have expanded
the ability of the NLRB to assert jurisdiction over CAAs.
The ªrst strand of NLRB decisions does not refer speciªcally to
CAAs but analyzes generally whether employers with government contracts are covered by or are exempt from the NLRA. From 1979 to 1995,
the NLRB used a two-prong test to determine whether it had jurisdiction
over such an employer: the employer not only had to meet the NLRA’s
deªnition of an employer—it could not be a public employer or “political
subdivision”94—but also had to retain “sufªcient control over the employment conditions of its employees to bargain with a labor organization as their representative.”95 Under this test, an employer that received
government funding but that did not qualify as a public subdivision might
still be able to escape NLRB jurisdiction if it could demonstrate that the
stringent requirements of its government funding did not allow it enough
ºexibility to bargain over working conditions.96
In 1995, however, the NLRB reªned its test to determine jurisdiction. In Management Training Corporation,97 the NLRB found that the
second prong of the test, which it characterized as being about the “control of economic terms and conditions,”98 was “an over-simpliªcation of
the bargaining process”99 and as such was “unworkable and unrealistic.”100 The NLRB limited its analysis of whether it should assert jurisdiction to the ªrst prong of the test: whether the employer in question meets

92

See id.
Ebb notes, however, that the “crazy-quilt” of state labor laws did not uniformly advantage or disadvantage one party, describing a situation where the laws “in some states
helped employers seeking to avoid unionization or limit the power of unions, in other
states advantaged unions, and in still other states beneªted both employers and unions,
depending on the particular issue.” Id.
94 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
95 Nat’l Trans. Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 565, 565 (1979). In this decision, the NLRB
abandoned another test it had sometimes used to assert jurisdiction, the “intimate connection” test. See Debra Dyleski Najjar, Note, The National Labor Relations Board’s Jurisdiction over Employers Contracting with Exempt Public Entities, 62 B.U. L. Rev. 1197,
1212–17 (1982). The “control test” had ªrst been articulated by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Atkins, 331 U.S. 398, 405–06 (1947).
96 See, e.g., Res-Care, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 670, 674 (1986) (NLRB declined to assert jurisdiction over an agency funded by the Department of Labor because the terms of the
agency’s employment conditions were set by the Department).
97 Mgmt. Training Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1355 (1995).
98 Id. at 1357.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1355.
93

262

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 38

the NLRA’s deªnition of an employer.101 This expansive deªnition allows
the NLRB to assert jurisdiction more frequently.
The NLRA provides that any party may appeal a ªnal NLRB decision to a federal court of appeals for the region involved. 102 Four of the
ªve circuits that have heard a case on the new Management Training rule
have adopted it,103 one actually adopting it in the context of approving
NLRB jurisdiction over a Head Start program.104 While the state of the
Management Training rule is in some legal ºux,105 the general trend in
the federal courts of appeals seems to be towards approving NLRB jurisdiction based on whether the employer in question meets the NLRA’s
deªnition of an employer.
How to determine whether an employer is an exempt “political subdivision” is not itself an easy task, however. A second strand of NLRB
decisions has clariªed and limited the facts under which a CAA may
qualify as an exempt “political subdivision.” In 1971, the Supreme Court
gave some guidance regarding the types of entities that may constitute a
“political subdivision” and thus be exempt from the NLRA. The Court
noted that the NRLB had adopted a two-prong test, “entitled to great respect,”106 classifying an entity as a political subdivision only if it was
“‘created directly by the state, so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of the government,’” or if it was “‘administered by individuals who are responsible to public ofªcials or to the general electorate.’”107
The ªrst prong of the NLRB test is fairly straightforward in its application to CAAs: if the state created the CAA to administer its programs directly, the CAA counts as an exempt political subdivision. The

101 Id. at 1358. The NLRB noted that all employers must still meet “the applicable
monetary jurisdictional standards.” Id. These standards vary by industry and refer to the
amount of business done each year by the employer in question. See supra note 86, at 54–
55.
102 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2000).
103 See NLRB v. YWCA, 192 F.3d 1111, 1119 (8th Cir. 1999); Aramark Corp. v.
NLRB, 179 F.3d 872, 881 n.15 (10th Cir. 1999); Teledyne Econ. Dev. v. NLRB, 108 F.3d
56, 60 (4th Cir. 1997); Pikeville United Methodist Hosp. of Ky., Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 109 F.3d 1146, 1153 (6th Cir. 1997); Saipan Hotel Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.3d
994, 997–98 (9th Cir. 1997). The Seventh Circuit decided the case without reaching the
issue. See NLRB v. Fed. Sec., Inc., 154 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 1998).
104 See YWCA, 192 F.3d at 1116–19.
105 The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have not yet heard a
case on the Management Training rule; by default, those circuits are covered by the control
test. See Cmty. Action Program Legal Servs. (CAPLAW), Head Start: An Outline
of Administrative and Judicial Decisions 63–66 (2002).
106 See NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins County, 402 U.S. 600, 605 (1971).
107 Id. at 604–05 (quoting the government’s brief). However, the Court noted that “this
case does not require that we decide whether ‘the actual operations and characteristics’ of
an entity must necessarily feature one or the other of the Board’s limitations to qualify an
entity for exemption” because the Court was able to decide the case on other grounds. Id.
at 605.
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NLRB continues to ªnd CAAs created by the state as exempt from the
NLRA under this ªrst prong of the test.108
It is on the second prong that the NLRB has recently changed its
thinking. Until 1998, the NLRB had considered any CAA that was not
exempt under the ªrst prong to be exempt under the second prong because of the statutorily mandated structure of the CAA board.109 CAAs
are governed by a tripartite board: one-third of the board must be elected
public ofªcials;110 at least one-third of the board must be representatives
of the poor in the community served;111 and the balance must come from
other community groups.112 Since the public ofªcials are democratically
elected to their political positions, although not to the CAA board, and
since the representatives of the poor must be “chosen [to be on the CAA
board] in accordance with democratic selection procedures,”113 the NLRB
used to reason that the CAA board consists of a majority of “individuals
who are responsible to public ofªcials or to the general electorate,”114
under the second prong of its test.115 Governed by such a board, the CAA
would be exempt from the NLRA.
In the 1998 decision Enrichment Services Program, Inc., however,
the NLRB changed its reasoning by examining more closely the “democratic selection procedures” under which the representatives of the poor
are chosen.116 The NLRB noted that the electorate for the slots reserved
for representatives of the poor was not usually the same as the electorate
for a general political election.117 Only if the electorate were the same
would a majority of the individuals on the CAA board be responsible to
the general electorate and thus exempt from the NLRA.118 In reaching
this decision, the NLRB overruled the line of cases ªnding CAAs to be
exempt political subdivisions where the two electorates were not the
same.119
This NLRB decision has yet to be tested in any federal court, and
some lawyers for CAAs expect to see it challenged.120 When a federal
court disagrees with the NLRB, it is the court’s opinion that is control108

See, e.g., Hinds County Human Res. Agency, 331 N.L.R.B. 1404 (2000).
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9910 (2000) (establishing the structure of CAA boards).
110 Id. § 9910(a)(2)(A).
111 Id. § 9910(a)(2)(B).
112 Id. § 9910(a)(2)(C). In the context of this struggle over NLRB jurisdiction, it is interesting to note that labor organizations are among the community groups mentioned as
candidates for sending representatives to this part of the CAA board. Id.
113 Id. § 9910(a)(2)(B)(i).
114 See NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins County, 402 U.S. 600, 604–05
(1971).
115 See, e.g., Woodbury County Cmty. Action Agency, 299 N.L.R.B. 554, 555 (1990);
Econ. Sec. Corp. of S.W. Area, 299 N.L.R.B. 562, 563 (1990).
116 See Enrichment Servs. Program, Inc., 325 N.L.R.B. 818 (1998).
117 See id. at 819.
118 See id.
119 See id. at 820 n.13.
120 See Ebb, supra note 91, at 6 n.3.
109
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ling, at least in that federal circuit, and it is possible that different judicially enforced standards may emerge in different areas of the country
unless and until the Supreme Court decides the matter.121 Even in the administrative context itself, it is worth noting that there has been turn-over
in the ªve members of the NLRB since 1998, when the Enrichment Services Program standard was announced, and that a new Board may decide the matter differently.122 Still, although the ultimate state of this law
is uncertain, the new NLRB analysis making it more difªcult for CAAs
to gain exemption from the NLRA has provided CAA employees, including Head Start teachers, with a greater probability that federal labor laws
will protect them.
Yet the nominal protection of federal labor laws goes only so far. Although the labor movement perceives NLRB jurisdiction over CAAs as a
success, continuing administrative maneuvering and litigation over these
issues may work to the strategic advantage of employers, which can use
legal challenges to delay tangible union accomplishments.123 In addition,
jurisdiction is a legal description of the NLRB’s reach rather than a structural modiªcation of a CAA’s behavior, and CAAs have sometimes continued anti-union activities despite the requirements of the NLRA.
Such anti-union activity does have prescribed legal boundaries, however, both from the terms of the NLRA and from the Head Start Act itself. CAAs that are covered by the NLRA must abide by its terms to remain within the law. Further, as of 1990, the Head Start Act explicitly
directs that “[f]unds appropriated to carry out this subchapter shall not be
used to assist, promote, or deter union organizing.”124 How, then, have
Head Start programs and Community Action Agencies that operate them
been able to carry out their anti-union campaigns?
The answer may be found in two recent information memoranda issued by the federal Head Start Bureau, the regulatory agency responsible
for funding, monitoring, and communicating with individual Head Start
programs.125 Disseminated in response to the rise in unionization efforts,
121

See id.
As of this writing, the only current member of the Board who also decided Enrichment Services Program is Wilma Liebman, who was appointed by President Clinton in
1997 and whose term expires in December 2002. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., NLRB
Board Members, at http://www.nlrb.gov/board.html (last modiªed Aug. 12, 2002).
123 See Tevlin, supra note 5.
124 42 U.S.C. § 9839(e) (2000). The provenance of this new clause is not entirely clear.
There is no mention of union activity in the House or Senate hearings surrounding the
1990 reauthorization of the Head Start Act, and the House Conference Report simply recommends the change without explaining any reason for its insertion. See H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 101-816, at 1, 11 (1990). Similar language forbidding the use of federal funds for
activities connected with union campaigns started to appear in other Congressional authorizations at least as far back as 1982, when it was inserted into the Job Training Partnership Act. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-889, at 127 (1982). There may well be an interesting
story behind the clause, both in the Head Start Act and elsewhere, but recounting this
background is beyond the scope of this Note.
125 See Information Memorandum ACYF-IM-HS-00-11 from the Head Start Bureau,
122
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the memoranda have two goals. First, they refer agencies to the NLRB
for information regarding which anti-union activities are legal and which
are illegal under the terms of the NLRA.126 Second, they clarify the Head
Start Act’s prohibition on using Head Start funds in response to a union
campaign.127 They explain that, although no Head Start funds may be
used in connection with a pro- or anti-union campaign, agencies may use
other funds in this vein so long as they document their spending and their
funding sources.128 Further, the memoranda indicate that Head Start funds
may cover incidental costs, such as utilities used during an after-hours
union organizing meeting, and may be used to consult lawyers about
“rights and responsibilities” under the NLRA and other laws related to
union organizing.129 Notwithstanding these limitations on the use of Head
Start funds to deter union organizing, some Head Start employers have
found a way to ªght nascent unions in their midst. They remain within
the bounds of the Head Start Act by using non-Head Start funds for these
activities, but they simultaneously violate the terms of the NLRA in the
process by engaging in unfair labor practices.
Accusations of these unfair labor practices constitute the second
type of legal battle between Head Start employees and employers. Both
employers and unions may bring an unfair labor practice (ULP) charge
against the other party in front of the NLRB, although in practice, unions
ªle these charges more frequently than do employers.130 In the Head Start
context, employers have been found in violation of the labor laws for
retaliating against employees who were engaged in legal unionizing activities. Within the past ªve years, directors of Head Start programs have
violated labor laws in numerous ways: by discharging or threatening to
discharge teachers who supported the union;131 by harassing union members through false accusations of theft or the imposition of new restricU.S. Department of Health & Human Services, to Head Start Grantees and Delegate Agencies, Head Start and Labor Unions (Mar. 27, 2000), available at http://www.headstartinfo.
org/publications/im00/im00_11.htm [hereinafter Labor Unions Memorandum]; Information Memorandum ACYF-IM-HS-97-14 from the Head Start Bureau, U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services, to Head Start Grantees and Delegate Agencies, Head Start
Funds and Union Organizing (Nov. 19, 1997), available at http://www.headstartinfo.org/
publications/im97/im97_14.htm [hereinafter Funds and Union Organizing Memorandum].
126 Labor Unions Memorandum, supra note 125, at 1; Funds and Union Organizing
Memorandum, supra note 125, at 1.
127 Labor Unions Memorandum, supra note 125, at 2–3; Funds and Union Organizing
Memorandum, supra note 125, at 1–2.
128 See Labor Unions Memorandum, supra note 125, at 2–3; Funds and Union Organizing Memorandum, supra note 125, at 1–2.
129 Labor Unions Memorandum, supra note 125, at 3; Funds and Union Organizing
Memorandum, supra note 125, at 2.
130 See Dan Morgan, Pressure on NLRB Turns into a Doubled Budget Cut, Wash.
Post, July 20, 1995, at A8 (reporting that a majority of unfair labor practice complaints are
ªled against employers, but that approximately ªfteen percent are ªled against unions).
131 See, e.g., FiveCAP, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1165, 1222 (2000); Parents in Cmty. Action,
Inc., No. 18-CA-14406, 1998 NLRB LEXIS 460, at *267–*268 (NLRB A.L.J. July 15,
1998).
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tions on their use of program facilities;132 by scheduling mandatory
teachers’ meetings at the same time as previously scheduled union meetings;133 by refusing to negotiate with the union at all.134 The list goes on.
Even if the NLRB ªnds merit in the union’s claim, however, the victory is not unmitigated. Relationships in the CAA often are damaged by
these charges and administrative hearings, and the parties may ªnd it
difªcult to move on. For example, one of the most recent Head Start ULP
cases to come before the NLRB was the third such case out of the same
CAA over a period of ªve years. The Head Start directors were found to
have engaged in many of the unfair labor practices described above and a
wide variety of others.135 The administrative law judge deciding this most
recent case commented sadly on the “substantial history of [the parties’]
contentious relationship. That history records in many instances [the
CAA’s] open hostility at its highest management level both to the Union
and employees who supported its organizing efforts.”136 The judge further
stated, “It is my fervent hope, that with the conclusion of this case, this
marks the end of [this] repetitious and somewhat wasteful litigation
. . . .”137 Yet he noted that “matters between the parties have not completely settled,” even though the collective bargaining agreement had
been signed two years earlier.138 Although the judge bid the parties to follow the new procedures put in place by the contract as the parties “attempt to fulªll, as they are committed to, the difªcult but nonetheless
worthy goal of providing educational and other opportunities to disadvantaged Americans,”139 his decision—spanning more than one hundred
pages—gives no indication of how the legal resolution of these issues
will translate into a change in the actual dynamics of the parties’ relationship.
Further, resolution of a ULP in one party’s favor is not necessarily
an unqualiªed victory or loss for either party, since the remedy may be
unsatisfactory to the victor. For example, consider the case of Jan Radder, a Head Start teacher ªred from Parents in Community Action, Inc., a
CAA in Minneapolis, for his involvement in organizing a union.140 When
132 See, e.g., FiveCAP, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 769, at *11–*12
(Oct. 31, 2000).
133 See, e.g., Parents in Cmty. Action, 1998 NLRB LEXIS 460, at *268.
134 See, e.g., YWCA, 324 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 1997 NLRB LEXIS 689, at *5 (NLRB
Sept. 11, 1997), enforced by NLRB v. YWCA, 192 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 1999).
135 FiveCAP, Inc., No. GR-7-CA-43295, 2001 NLRB LEXIS 903 (Nov. 2, 2001);
FiveCAP, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 769 (Oct. 31, 2000), aff ’g and
modifying No. GR-7-CA-39503, 1998 NLRB LEXIS 965 (NLRB A.L.J. Dec. 17, 1998);
FiveCAP, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1165, 1222 (2000), aff ’g and modifying No. GR-7-CA37182, 1997 NLRB LEXIS 86 (NLRB A.L.J. Jan. 31, 1997).
136 FiveCAP, 2001 NLRB LEXIS 903, at *68.
137 Id.
138 Id at *69.
139 Id.
140 See Parents in Cmty. Action, Inc., No. 18-CA-14406, 1998 NLRB LEXIS 460, at
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Radder was ªred, the union ªled initial charges of unfair labor practices
against the CAA.141 After examining the facts, the NLRB petitioned the
district court in the District of Minnesota for a preliminary injunction
against the CAA’s anti-union activity,142 as permitted by the terms of the
NLRA.143 Yet the district court declined to issue an injunction, and a year
later the Eighth Circuit afªrmed its decision.144
The Eighth Circuit explained that a court may issue a preliminary injunction only after the NLRB has demonstrated that “irreparable harm”
will come to the collective bargaining process if the parties must wait for
a remedy before the NLRB has ªnished adjudicating the matter.145 While
the district court agreed that the teacher had likely been ªred for his union activities, it declined to order him to be reinstated, since revisions to
the federal Head Start requirements for teacher qualiªcations meant that
Radder was no longer qualiªed to hold his position.146 The Eighth Circuit
held that the district court was correct in not ordering his reinstatement
because, in balancing the public interest with the likelihood of irreparable injury to Radder, the district court reasonably determined that the
Head Start program would suffer if Radder were reinstated.147 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit noted that injury to the individual was not the
appropriate standard for determining whether an injunction is appropriate, given the existence of a monetary remedy; the key issue is ongoing
irreparable injury to the union organizing drive.148 An employer’s actions
that may chill union organizing do not establish such irreparable harm,
the court decided, unless collective bargaining has been ongoing or a
scheduled union election has been disrupted, especially if unionization
efforts have not garnered widespread support from employees.149 The
court did not consider the negative effect that anti-union activities might
*267–*268 (NLRB A.L.J. July 15, 1998). This is the same CAA discussed supra in the text
accompanying notes 64–67.
141 See Sharp v. Parents in Cmty. Action, Inc., 172 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir. 1999).
142 See id.
143 The Act states that:
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint . . . charging that any
person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any
United States district court, within any district wherein the unfair labor practice in
question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts
business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the ªling of
any such petition the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary
relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper.
29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (2000).
144 See Sharp, 172 F.3d at 1037, 1040.
145 Id. at 1038.
146 See id. at 1039.
147 See id.
148 See id. at 1040.
149 See id.
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have had on the union drive itself, however, nor could it consider any
additional negative impact that this court decision might have.
As this case was wending its way through the federal courts, an administrative law judge of the NLRB determined that the CAA had committed almost a dozen unfair labor practices in its attempts to keep its
employees from forming a union.150 The NLRB ordered among other
remedies that Radder be reinstated,151 but the Eighth Circuit’s recognition
that Radder was no longer qualiªed under the new Head Start requirements made that reinstatement unlikely. While the union won a victory in
the NLRB forum, in that the unfair labor practice charge was decided in
its favor, the actual remedy was hardly what the union members had
hoped for. The ªred union activist was not reinstated, and the CAA was
able to continue its anti-union activity with no preliminary injunction to
stop it, all seemingly with the imprimatur of the federal court system. On
the other hand, despite its victory in the federal courts, the CAA lost in
the NLRB and received bad press for its anti-union activities.152 In the
end, the legal maneuvering in the Head Start unionization struggle can
achieve only limited success.

150 Parents in Cmty. Action, Inc., No. 18-CA-14406, 1998 LEXIS 460, at *267–*268
(NLRB A.L.J. July 15, 1998). Speciªcally, the administrative law judge found that:

Parents in Community Action, Inc. has committed unfair labor practices affecting
commerce by issuing a warning memo to and discharging Jan Radder and by discharging Rose Ryan, in violation of Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and by
coercively interrogating employees about their union activities and those of their
coworkers; by threatening that if employees chose to become represented by Minnesota Federation of Teachers they would be subjected to deteriorating working
conditions, such as loss of paid holidays, parents being unable to become assistant
teachers without teaching degrees or certiªcates, elimination of year-end personal
and sick leave, and being required to start punching a timeclock; by threatening to
retaliate against employees for discussing the above-named union while working,
in the absence of a valid rule prohibiting discussions during work time; by threatening adverse consequences to an employee’s future if she gave testimony or information concerning the above-named union or concerning the unlawful termination of a coworker; by prohibiting distribution of union literature at McKnight
Center in the absence of a valid work rule restricting distribution of literature; by
telling an employee that union literature may not be distributed because statements in it are personally offensive to a center’s director; by telling an employee
that union activities could be conducted during work time only so long as the center director did not personally disapprove of them; by creating the impression of
surveillance of employees’ union activities; by scheduling a meeting with employees timed to conºict with a meeting of employees previously scheduled by
the above-named union; and by prematurely conferring wage increases to discourage employees from supporting the above-named union.
Id.
151

See id. at *268–*269.
See, e.g., Grow, supra note 64; Jon Tevlin, Firing of Two Head Start Employees Violated Labor Laws, A Judge Rules, Star Trib. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), July 21, 1998, at D1;
Tevlin, supra note 5.
152
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II. Strategies for Reform
These arenas—the practical, the rhetorical, and the legal—provide
the stages on which the main conºicts between labor and management in
Head Start programs and Community Action Agencies are acted out. But
what happens next? How can the parties move beyond such conºicts the
better to accomplish their shared mission? This Part proposes three types
of solutions: legislative changes to the Head Start Act, regulatory alterations from the Head Start Bureau, and external relationship-building and
problem-solving solutions from the National Head Start Association.
A. The Head Start Act: Legislative Solutions
The Head Start Act is up for reauthorization this year.153 Modiªcations to the Head Start Act in four areas would help alleviate conºicts
related to unionization.
First, the reauthorized Act should include a stronger prohibition
against using Head Start funds to assist, promote, or deter union organizing. A complete ban on the provision of Head Start funds to organizations that are engaged in these activities would likely be deemed an unconstitutional restriction on free speech.154 Furthermore, Congress may
be reluctant to bind agencies’ hands too tightly. Given the recent debates
about job protection and civil service unions in the proposed Department
of Homeland Security,155 Congress might prefer to let agencies decide for
themselves whether to deter unions using non-federal funds.
Given these concerns, a more reasonable and politically feasible
change would be the addition of the following sentence to the Head Start
Act: “Receipt of Head Start funds is contingent on an organization’s
obeying the relevant state and federal labor laws.” Why should Congress
continue to provide ªnancial support under one act to an organization
that ignores the requirements of another? Yet CAAs have ºouted labor
laws, and have been cited by the NLRB for unfair labor practices, with
no apparent effect on their Head Start budgets.156 The Head Start regula153 In 1995, Congress reauthorized Head Start programs through the end of ªscal year
2003. Coats Human Services Reauthorization Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-285, § 416,
112 Stat. 2702, 2772.
154 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991) (“[O]ur ‘unconstitutional conditions’ cases involve situations in which the Government has placed a condition on the
recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively
prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the
federally funded program.”).
155 See, e.g., David Firestone, Unions Lobby to Safeguard Proposed Agency’s Workers,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2002, at A18.
156 The decisions of the Departmental Appeals Board, the board within the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) that hears disputes involving HHS agencies, do not
appear to report any funding termination or other ramiªcations for Head Start agencies that
have been cited by the NLRB for unfair labor practices. Labor law violations do occasion-
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tions already contain a proscription against violating federal laws for entities receiving federal money.157 Making this requirement statutory and
tying it explicitly to the Head Start unionization context would demonstrate the importance of obeying labor laws. It also would clarify the
Head Start Bureau’s authority to initiate proceedings against Head Start
agencies that engage in unfair labor practices. Unless Congress more
strongly afªrms its support for the NLRA and state labor laws, agencies
will be able to break labor laws with no ªnancial repercussions for their
Head Start programs.
A second change to the Head Start Act that might alleviate or reduce
union conºicts would be the required development of federal regulations
on labor-management relations. Aside from the stipulation that no Head
Start funds be used in connection with union organizing, the Act contains
no reference to labor-management relations, even though such relations
are increasingly important as unionization efforts occur with greater frequency. The Act already mandates the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services to establish “policies and procedures” and
“appropriate administrative measures” to ensure that various program
goals are met, such as the provision of services to a certain percentage of
children with disabilities, or the equitable distribution of resources between urban and rural areas.158 Similarly, the Act should require the Head
Start Bureau to develop its own policies and procedures on labor relations. Such a requirement would demonstrate a programmatic commitment to ensuring that labor relations run smoothly.
In the same vein, the reauthorized Act could require the development
of a set of performance standards for management. The Act presently
contains a detailed list of standards that the Secretary of Health and Human Services must create, including those for educational, administrative, and ªnancial performance, and for facility conditions and locations.159 Another set of detailed requirements focuses on teacher and staff
qualiªcations.160 Just as teachers must have certain educational backgrounds and follow speciªed classroom procedures, so managers could
be obligated to take classes in labor-management relations, human resources, and leadership, and to reach designated performance levels in

ally prompt the termination of a Head Start grantee’s funding, but this penalty has not been
levied consistently. See, e.g., Rural Day Care Ass’n of Northeastern N.C., No. A-94-38,
DAB No. 1489 (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Appeals Bd. Aug. 8, 1994), 1994 WL
618572 (terminating grantee’s funding not because of anti-union activity, but rather because of wage violations and other misconduct).
157 45 C.F.R. § 1303.14(b)(9) (2001) (“Financial assistance may be terminated for any
or all of the following reasons . . . . The grantee fails to abide by any other terms and conditions of its award of ªnancial assistance, or any other applicable laws, regulations, or
other applicable Federal or State requirements or policies.”).
158 See 42 U.S.C. § 9835(d)–(f) (2000).
159 See id. § 9836a.
160 See id. § 9843a.
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their interactions with employees. Such a provision would send a clear
message that Head Start programs can work smoothly only if managers
as well as teachers are held accountable. Training in management skills
could also lead to improved labor relations. Requiring agencies to monitor labor relations and to develop performance standards for management
would signal the federal government’s commitment to improving labor
relations in Head Start agencies.
Third, the reauthorized Act should revisit the issue of salary and
beneªt levels so that the urge to increase employee compensation is not
undercut by a race to the bottom. The current version of the Head Start
Act does emphasize the importance of adequate salary and beneªt levels.
For example, the Act indicates that such levels at their base should be
“adequate to attract and retain qualiªed staff,”161 and it suggests that additional “[q]uality improvement funds” should be set aside “to improve the
compensation (including beneªts) of classroom teachers and other staff
of Head Start agencies and thereby enhance recruitment and retention of
qualiªed staff.”162 Yet the Act also includes language that limits agencies’
ºexibility in designing generous compensation packages:
The Secretary shall take such action as may be necessary to assure that persons employed in carrying out programs ªnanced
under this subchapter shall not receive compensation at a rate
which is (1) in excess of the average rate of compensation paid
in the area where the program is carried out to a substantial
number of persons providing substantially comparable services,
or in excess of the average rate of compensation paid to a substantial number of the persons providing substantially comparable services in the area of the person’s immediately preceding
employment, whichever is higher; or (2) less than the minimum
wage . . . .163
The ºoor for Head Start salaries is simple—staff must make at least
the minimum wage.164 This is not much of a requirement, however, given
the general applicability of the minimum wage.165 The discussion of the
ceiling for Head Start salaries is more complicated—Head Start staff
cannot be paid more than the average rate for other workers providing
“substantially comparable services” in the same geographic area. How-

161

Id. § 9835(a)(3)(B)(iii).
See id. § 9835(a)(3)(C).
163 Id. § 9848.
164 The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2000), establishes a variety
of labor policies that cover employers and employees in the private sector and government.
The statute requires a minimum wage, which has been $5.15 per hour since September 1,
1997. Id. § 206(a)(1).
165 See id. § 206.
162
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ever these “substantially comparable services” are deªned, it is clear that
the services provided by Head Start employees are not provided by wellpaid workers in other occupations.
Instead of stipulating that Head Start staff earn no more than the going rate, the Act could mandate that Head Start staff earn at least as much
as other workers providing “substantially comparable services.” This
change would convert the current ceiling into a new ºoor, and would preclude government-funded programs from undercutting what is already a
low-wage labor market. Alternatively, the Act could require Head Start
salaries and beneªts to be commensurate with the compensation packages provided to teachers in local school districts. This approach would
address the aforementioned concern about disparities in compensation
and the consequent brain-drain of Head Start teachers to the public
school system.166 In any event, the current limit on Head Start salaries
prevents agencies from experimenting with the full range of salary and
beneªt packages and places an unreasonable ceiling on compensation,
thereby undermining the statutory mandate to attract and retain qualiªed
candidates.
Finally, the Act should be altered to provide incentives for research
on labor-management relations in Head Start programs. Not enough academic research on Head Start employees and workforce management
exists, since the wealth of Head Start research focuses (understandably
and reasonably) on child and family development outcomes.167 Because
the Head Start union campaigns repeatedly ªght with management over
the same concerns, however, thorough and systematic attention must be
paid to these issues at a national level. The Head Start Act already authorizes funding for several speciªed research topics;168 designating labor
and employment issues in Head Start programs as a new priority area for
research would be a step in the right direction. In addition, the Act should
identify teachers and union ofªcials as important groups to consult in the
establishment of research agendas, since these groups currently are excluded from the list of important players.169
In addition to empirical research on wages and pensions, there is a
particular need for research on the effects of unionizing on the CAA
workplace and on Head Start program success. Qualitative research, including descriptions of best practices in employee-management relations,
also would be useful. Not all CAAs with Head Start programs have met
166

See discussion supra Part I.A.
A bibliography compiled by the Head Start Bureau contains 2900 entries covering
almost forty years of research, of which 655 articles fall into the category of “Management
and Stafªng”; of these, no more than a few dozen focus on employment conditions, and
many of those examine only salary levels. See Head Start Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., Annotated Bibliography of Head Start Research, at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/hsb2/biblio/index.jsp (last modiªed June 17, 2002).
168 See 42 U.S.C. § 9844 (2000).
169 See id. § 9844(c).
167
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unionization drives with rancor, and it would be instructive to understand
what other models exist. A body of work devoted to cataloguing and analyzing the stories from CAAs and Head Start programs that have witnessed unionization would inform the struggles to come and, with any
luck, would help the parties move from conºict to common ground.
B. The Head Start Bureau: Regulatory Changes
Although the Head Start Bureau has responded to the rise in Head
Start unionization efforts by issuing the aforementioned information
memoranda,170 its independent ability to address labor-management tensions is limited, for the Bureau must follow the dictates of Congress. If
Congress adopts the four recommendations discussed above, the Head
Start Bureau will be authorized to create and implement an extensive series of regulations designed to promote improved labor-management relations. Even in the absence of such changes, however, the Bureau’s hands
are not completely tied. Although the Head Start Act has very detailed
requirements, the Bureau retains some discretion to develop regulations
through the usual administrative process of rule-making and the explicit
terms of the Head Start Act.171 Thus, the Bureau might undertake a number of helpful initiatives, such as revising current regulations to favor
agencies with clear labor relations plans in the grantee selection process,
or expanding the provision of training and technical assistance on labor
and employment issues to funding recipients, within already statutorily
approved guidelines.
For example, the regulation on grantee selection currently provides
that candidates will be chosen based on “the extent to which the applicants demonstrate in their application the most effective Head Start program.”172 The applicable criteria include “the qualiªcations and experience of the applicant and the applicant’s staff in planning, organizing and
providing comprehensive child development services at the community
level, including the administrative and ªscal capability of the applicant to
administer all Head Start programs carried out in the designated service
area.”173 It would not be too much of a stretch to consider management’s
labor relations skills and human resources training plans as evidence of
“administrative capability.” Explicit reference to these criteria would put
applicants on notice that such issues are important and would require

170 See Labor Unions Memorandum, supra note 125; Funds and Union Organizing
Memorandum, supra note 125.
171 See generally Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); see also
Head Start Act § 640, 42 U.S.C. § 9835(d)–(f) (using broad language authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish “policies and procedures” and “appropriate administrative measures” to ensure a variety of program goals).
172 45 C.F.R. § 1302.10(a) (2001).
173 Id. § 1302.10(b)(2).
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them to establish relevant procedures and policies before they receive any
funding.
After being chosen as Head Start grant recipients, agencies are required to develop written personnel policies that contain, among other
items, “a description of employee-management relations procedures, including those for managing employee grievances and adverse actions.”174
The regulations could go one step further and require that training on
these written policies be provided to managers and employees.
Finally, the regulations already mandate that directors of Head Start
programs “have demonstrated skills and abilities in a management capacity relevant to human services program management.”175 Since the Act’s
requirements with regard to the skills and knowledge that teachers must
possess are much more detailed, it would be reasonable for the regulations to further elaborate management’s qualiªcations as well, perhaps by
stipulating that directors must be trained in labor and employment law
and experienced in fostering employee leadership.
Beyond getting new regulations on the books, the Head Start Bureau
should undertake a second major initiative even in the absence of a new
legislative mandate—expanding its provision of training and technical
assistance to Head Start directors. For instance, many directors need help
in interpreting and complying with the NLRA. The information memoranda on union organizing were an important ªrst step in a national response to this new issue facing Head Start programs, but more needs to
be done. Instead of simply listing a few actions that violate the NLRA
and sending people to the NLRB’s Web site for further information,176 the
Bureau could create Head Start-speciªc training material on the NLRA,
perhaps using case studies from the various conºicts described in Part I
above.
The Head Start Bureau also could provide additional training on
sound management practices. Its regulations manual cites to written
works on program governance, management systems and procedures, and
human resources management, but most of these references are at least a
decade old and make almost no mention of labor-management relations.177 The Bureau should create and disseminate up-to-date materials
on such practices. It is worth noting that the federal Child Care Bureau,
which is adjacent to the Head Start Bureau in Washington, D.C., has been
174

Id. § 1301.31(a)(7).
Id. § 1304.52(c).
176 See, e.g., Labor Unions Memorandum, supra note 125.
177 See Head Start Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Head Start
Program Performance Standards and Other Regulations 240 (1999). The lack of
any reference to collaborative employee-management practices is especially strange, since
the Head Start philosophy (as articulated in 45 C.F.R. § 1304.50 (2001)) emphasizes the
importance of collaboration with parents and the community for an effective program. The
failure to mention collaborative employee-management processes is almost certainly attributable to the Head Start Act’s inattention to employee-labor relations.
175
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funding research projects on the workforce in child care programs for
several years, although nothing in its authorizing statute requires it to do
so.178 Even if the reauthorized Head Start statute contains no reference to
research on labor relations, the Head Start Bureau could still begin a research initiative on workforce issues modeled after that of the Child Care
Bureau, and could provide additional training to grantees based on the
research ªndings.
Finally, the Head Start Bureau could inform its grantees about alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in labor conºicts. The second information memorandum on union organizing includes an explicit disclaimer for the ACF, explaining that this agency “plays an important but
limited role” in the area of labor disputes—ensuring that no Head Start
money is spent to deter or promote labor unions in violation of the statute.179 The memorandum emphasizes that the NLRB, not ACF or the
Head Start Bureau, is responsible for enforcing compliance with the
NLRA, and that “it is not appropriate for ACF to become involved in activities such as arbitrating disputes between unions and Head Start grantees.”180
The appearance of this explanation of ACF’s role in the second
memorandum suggests that Head Start agencies turned to ACF and the
Head Start Bureau for guidance and assistance, and that such assistance
was deemed inappropriate. Yet because the Head Start Bureau ultimately
is responsible for ensuring that Head Start programs run smoothly and
effectively, this agency must play a role in preempting and ameliorating
labor conºicts. The Bureau currently contracts with outside agencies to
provide resources on a variety of issues that affect Head Start programs,181 from transportation182 to facilities.183 It should do the same with
labor and employment issues. If it is not the Bureau’s job to mediate or
arbitrate in labor problems, it can at least provide resources to which
programs can turn.

178 See, e.g., Child Care Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Humans Servs., Field Initiated
Child Care Research Projects, at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ccb/research/ccprc/
ªeld/index.htm (last updated Sept. 26, 2002) (listing current grant recipients and providing
links to summaries of their grant proposals); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9858 (2000) (appropriating funds for execution of Child Care and Development Block Grant Act but making no
mention of research priorities).
179 See Labor Unions Memorandum, supra note 125.
180 See id.
181 See Head Start Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Programs and Services, at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/hsb/programs/index.htm (last modiªed June 12,
2002).
182 See, e.g., Nat’l Trans. Ctr. for Sch. Children, Who We Are, at http://www.mhwest.
com/NTCSC.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2002).
183 See, e.g., Nat’l Facilities Assistance Desk, Region IV Head Start Quality Improvement Ctrs., Facilities, at http://www.wku.edu/Info/General/TTAS/fac/index.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2002).
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C. The National Head Start Association:
Labor and Employment Initiative
Legislative and regulatory changes would go a long way towards
improving labor relations in Head Start programs, but they will not provide a complete solution. At the most basic level, the best way to move
beyond the current dynamic of conºict is to change the relationships between and among the different parties. The National Head Start Association (NHSA) should create a new labor and employment initiative to
bring the parties together for preemptive problem-solving before labor
strife emerges, and for mediation and conciliation services in moments of
dispute.
The NHSA is a private nonproªt membership organization whose
mission is to serve the interests of the entire national Head Start community: children, parents, staff, and directors.184 The NHSA has paid relatively little attention to the explosion of union organizing in Head Start
programs, however. For instance, its Web site provides resources and information for every sector of the Head Start community, but it contains
just one reference to unionizing efforts.185 Given the importance the
NHSA attaches to helping employees obtain raises and maintain job security,186 this organization should expand its focus on labor and employment issues to speak to all parties in the unionization debates.
In each arena of conºict discussed in Part I of this Note, the parties
raise important issues while creating dynamics that are not conducive to
long-term relationships. Each point of controversy is presented as a zerosum game where there can be only one winner. Thus, more work must be
done at the national and the local level to identify the common interests
that underlie the parties’ seemingly contrary positions. Given the shared
commitment to lifting families out of poverty and into self-sufªciency,
points of mutual beneªt are likely to exist. The proposed NHSA Labor
and Employment Initiative could provide a framework through which the
parties can discover areas of agreement and develop healthy working relationships before any labor strife emerges.
The existence of some labor conºicts will be inevitable, however,
and members of the Head Start community need resources to help them
work through their problems. The NHSA should partner with the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, or with a private nonproªt alternative dispute resolution organization, to provide both training and counsel184 See Nat’l Head Start Ass’n, About the National Head Start Association, at
http://www.nhsa.org/about/index.htm (last visited, Nov. 29, 2002).
185 See Nat’l Head Start Ass’n, Executive Challenges Conference, available at http://
www.nhsa.org/training/mini%5Ftraining/executive/executive%5Fsessions.htm (last visited
Nov. 29, 2002).
186 See Nat’l Head Start Ass’n, Why Join NHSA, at http://www.nhsa.org/join/index.htm
(last visited Nov. 29, 2002).
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ing to agencies experiencing conºict. Because so much of what is at
stake in labor discussions in the Head Start context refers to national
standards and requirements, a national organization that is familiar with
Head Start issues must take the lead in addressing them. Moreover, since
so many local disputes repeat themselves around the country, individuals
crafting solutions at the local level would beneªt from knowledge of the
rich array of experiences nationwide. The NHSA is well positioned to
play this important role.
Conclusion
Not all union drives in Community Action Agencies that operate
Head Start programs lead to rancor and bitterness, of course, but those
that do can be extremely divisive and hurtful to everyone involved. This
Note suggests that more attention must be paid at a national level to help
resolve these local manifestations of a national problem. I propose several strategies that might address some root causes of the conºict, but my
primary hope is that a greater focus on labor and employment issues in
these programs will generate even more solutions, not only for the struggle over unionization, but also for the nascent struggle over the living
wage. Since the missions of CAA-operated Head Start programs and the
labor movement overlap, labor and management should be able to work
together more effectively. Recall the union’s slogan cited at the beginning
of this Note: “Head Start works because we do.”187 If the word “we” in
this slogan can be expanded to encompass both directors and teachers,
and if directors and teachers can learn to work together on labor and employment issues more amicably and productively, then Head Start will
work even more successfully for everyone.

187

See Head Start Poster, supra note 14.

